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Abstract
Can John Dewey’s experiments at the University of Chicago’s Laboratory School 
teach contemporary inquirers about “learning by making?” This article warrants an 
affirmative answer to this query. Unlike intellectual historians who trace the source 
of Dewey’s and his colleagues’ 1890s pedagogies to their cultural biases, we contend 
that these experiments were substantially conditioned by pragmatic kinds of insights. 
Specifically, we argue that Dewey’s inquiries into own his children’s language devel-
opment influenced the development of his early educational experiments as well as 
his later pragmatic communicative philosophy. On this view, the Laboratory School 
experiments anticipate Dewey’s later thinking about communication. If so, rather than 
embarrassing educational pragmatists, Dewey’s and his colleagues’ work in the Labo-
ratory School might offer new starting points for thinking about pragmatic education. 
In an 1896 article for Kindergarten Magazine, John Dewey explained that the “child 
comes to school to do; to cook, to sew, to work with wood and tools in simple con-
structive acts; within and about these acts cluster the studies—writing, reading, 
arithmetic, etc.”1 With this statement, Dewey encapsulated a key principle in the 
elementary education pedagogy he was at that time developing at the University of 
Chicago’s Laboratory School. This school, which Dewey founded in 1896, explicitly 
experimented with new pedagogical techniques. Ultimately, the Laboratory School’s 
emphasis on occupations (e.g., cooking) would become the most distinctive aspect 
of Dewey’s and his colleagues’ experimentation with educational means. Simultane-
ously, Dewey and his fellow teachers were also experimenting with educational theory. 
In the terms of the educational theory that Dewey and his colleagues were 
developing in the 1890s, the School sought to make education in “the studies” 
primarily, and not secondarily, a function of “constructive acts.”2 Today, Dewey’s 
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and his colleagues’ historical inquiry into what we have identified as learning by 
making can suggest new perspectives on Dewey’s educational legacy. Whether 
approached as a means for responding to the narrow focus on discourse and dis-
cussion advanced by those who align Dewey with deliberative democracy, or, more 
speculatively, as a historical episode that anticipates contemporary “makerspace” 
pedagogies, the Laboratory School’s way of subordinating studies to constructive 
acts offers an occasion to rethink Dewey’s legacy. In particular, we would suggest 
that these pedagogical experiments contain good opportunities for reexamining 
Dewey’s early educational approach to literacy and rhetoric. 
Unhappily for those who see in the Laboratory School’s experiments prom-
ising pedagogical principles, scholarship on Dewey’s career has not recommended 
returns to his and his colleagues’ early educational work. Recently, for instance, 
Thomas Fallace’s Dewey and the Dilemma of Race criticized the Laboratory School’s 
teachers’ reluctance to “introduce students to letters, words, and numbers,” attrib-
uting this reluctance specifically to Dewey’s and his colleagues’ ethnocentric ideas 
about race and human psychology.3 Notably, the judgments of other literacy scholars 
align with Fallace’s characterization. Academics associated with the New London 
Group, to take an important example, have also tended to dismiss Dewey’s approach 
to literacy learning as grounded in racism.4 Although they do not tell the whole story 
of Dewey’s work in education, these assessments of Dewey’s educational experi-
ments discourage further investigation. As they suggest, if Dewey’s educational 
experiments primarily reflect his and his colleagues’ cultural biases, contemporary 
inquirers should not expect to recover from them useful contemporary methods. 
Fallace’s intellectual history contextualizes Dewey’s 1890s ethnocentrism 
in what it describes as Dewey’s development toward a wider pluralism, including in 
his thinking about race. In Fallace’s view, Dewey’s writings in the 1910s and 1920s 
reconstructed the ethnocentric assumptions about the cultural but not biological 
inferiority of nonwhite groups in which Dewey’s early educational experiments had 
participated.5 While agreeing with much in Fallace’s general account, we contend 
for a different perspective on Dewey’s experiments with literacy and communica-
tion education in the Laboratory School. Specifically, through our own intellectual 
history, we identify in Dewey’s contemporary attention to his children’s language 
development an underacknowledged influence on his thinking about education in 
the 1890s. In interactions between his philosophy and parenting in this period, we 
contend, Dewey began to formulate the innovative philosophy of communication for 
which he would advocate most effectively in the 1920s. Likewise, we believe, Dewey’s 
parenting also influenced his early approaches to education in the Laboratory School. 
By introducing the possibility that Dewey’s parenting experiences inspired 
Dewey’s eventual philosophy as well as his Laboratory School experiments, we hope 
to reinvigorate contemporary study of the Laboratory School. More generally, we 
seek to advance attention to “the interaction between Dewey’s lived experience and 
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the shaping of his philosophical [and educational] inquiry.”6 Craig A. Cunning-
ham, David Granger, Jane Fowler Morse, Barbara Stengel, and Terri Wilson have 
wondered whether the “contemporary power of Dewey’s thought rests, at least in 
part, in . . . his willingness to cultivate, appreciate and appropriate the thinking of 
interesting women and odd ducks.”7 Particularly to offer Dewey’s Laboratory School 
experiments as part of what Jessica Enoch and Cheryl Glenn have called a “‘usable 
past’” for literacy and rhetoric educators, we describe what we think Dewey learned 
about language from children—and specifically, his own children—and how that 
may have informed his thinking about language and communication.8 From these 
children, we believe, Dewey learned the beginnings of his pragmatic approach to 
communication. Accordingly, we assert that Dewey’s early educational experiments 
do not only partake of dominant late 19th century ethnocentrism (and racism); they 
can also stimulate efforts to rethink contemporary communication pedagogies.
In the sections to follow, we contend that Dewey’s early educational experi-
ments, and particularly his and his colleagues’ experiments in literacy education, 
reflect pragmatic insights and ideas that he derived from his parenting. Working 
from Dewey’s contemporary writings (including his archived correspondence), we 
argue that Dewey’s inquiries into his children’s language development influenced 
the conception and development of his pragmatic communicative philosophy. On 
this basis, we additionally suggest that Dewey’s inquiries into his children’s language 
development influenced his mid-1890s educational experiments in the Laboratory 
School. Finally, we discuss these claims as they might warrant archival reconsidera-
tion of Dewey’s and his colleagues’ work in the Laboratory School.
“An Inference from His Children”
In 1942, Dewey’s student Max Eastman remarked that it “is customary to regard 
Dewey’s educational theories as an inference from his instrumental philosophy, 
but more accurately they are an inference from his children.”9 In this and the two 
following sections, we contend that, like Dewey’s educational theories, Dewey’s 
pragmatic communicative philosophy also began at home.
In asserting our claim about where Dewey’s philosophy of communication 
began, we must also consider the question of when it began. Gert Biesta has identi-
fied Democracy and Education (1916) as the publication in which Dewey’s pragmatic 
account of communication first appeared, rejecting the notion that this work’s 
treatment of this subject was “the culmination of a line of thought that was already 
worked out in other publications.”10 Against Biesta’s assessment—and also against 
its way of privileging Dewey’s publications as the primary means by which Dewey 
“worked out” his thinking—we argue that Dewey’s experience as a parent in the 
1890s stimulated some of Dewey’s earliest pragmatic thinking about communica-
tion. Specifically, in helping Dewey to reconstruct the idealist view of language that 
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he had developed in previous years in Ann Arbor, MI, Dewey’s parenting led him 
to new, protopragmatic appreciations for language activity. 
Before his move to Chicago in 1894, Dewey had extended his idealist think-
ing about psychology and ethics into two linked conceptions of language. First, in 
the context of his neo-Hegelian system of psychology, Dewey identified specifically 
poetic language as the highest expression of art’s capacity to provide “a sense of 
those wholes which discover the interrelated unity of Spirit and can be clarified by 
reason.”11 Second, in the context of his increasingly experimental work on idealist 
ethical theory, Dewey identified in the “institutional development” of language a 
key agency for advancing the sociospiritual unity he called the “social organism.”12 
In both of these directions, Dewey found himself especially enthusiastic about the 
social and spiritual potency of literacy practice. 
After 1894, when Dewey moved from Ann Arbor to Chicago to take a position 
at the University of Chicago, Dewey’s thinking about language began to develop in 
significantly different directions. In particular, as Dewey engaged with Chicago’s 
academic psychologists, municipal reformers, and progressive educators, he lost 
much of his previous enthusiasm for literate activity. At the same time, drawing 
inspiration from William James’s Principles of Psychology, Dewey and his col-
league George Herbert Mead were attempting to “naturalize” contemporary ide-
alism’s accounts of language and communication.13 As we will see, in this period 
Dewey espoused language as “social communication,” “not,”—or not “primarily”—
“expression of thought.”14 In a word, Dewey was beginning to develop his distinc-
tively pragmatic account of language and communication.
Once developed, Dewey’s communicative philosophy was innovative. Par-
ticularly central to this innovative thinking about communication, as Biesta has 
summarized it, is Dewey’s insight that 
common understanding is not a condition for cooperation. It is not that we 
first need to come to a common understanding and only then can begin to 
coordinate our activities. For Dewey it is precisely the other way around: 
common understanding is produced by, is the outcome of successful com-
munication in action.15 
On this view, as Dewey argued, language is not merely the subject matter of linguis-
tic practice or reflection or a conduit for meaning in the quotidian sense. Rather, 
Dewey approached language in its “widest sense,” a sense including not only speak-
ing, writing, and gesture but also “rites, ceremonies, monuments and the products 
of industrial and fine arts.”16 In adopting (and elaborating) such a viewpoint on 
language, Dewey, like Ludwig Wittgenstein, “show[ed] the impossibility of a pri-
vate language.”17 In addition, as Scott Pratt has argued, Dewey also tried “to show 
what is needed for a public language.”18 Arguably, Dewey left for contemporary 
inquirers a stable platform on which to develop “a full-scale theory of discourse, a 
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philosophy of language, of the sort required for understanding how the symbols 
we use relate to the world in which we use them.”19 In any case, Dewey developed 
his own distinctive account of language and communication. 
Change in Dewey’s circle of intellectual intimates—and particularly his 
deepening ties with Chicago’s municipal and educational reformers—can help to 
explain the way that Dewey’s approach to these phenomena shifted away from the 
emphases of his previous idealism.20 Yet, these intellectual influences do not com-
prise the whole of the context in which Dewey began the process of rethinking com-
munication. In particular, and as Dewey’s publications and correspondence from 
this period can suggest, also important was Dewey’s interaction with his children. 
Dewey’s contemporary writings and correspondence hint at many influ-
ences on his thinking about language and communication in the mid-1890s. Yet, 
published and archival records of Dewey’s doings in 1894 do more than hint at the 
influence of his parenting on transitions in his thinking on these subjects. Most 
obviously, Dewey’s “The Psychology of Infant Language,” an article he published 
in Psychological Review in January of 1894, shows Dewey using data he gathered 
about his children to theorize language psychology. In particular, “The Psychology 
of Infant Language” shows Dewey thinking anew about language and its role in the 
individuation of individuals. Most suggestive of all his writings are John Dewey’s 
letters to Alice Dewey and his older children, Fred and Evelyn Dewey, who had 
begun a trip to Europe that John would later join.21 These letters detail John’s daily 
interactions with the family’s youngest child, a toddler named Morris who stayed 
with him in Chicago. Although written for the immediate purposes of sharing news 
and giving delight, these letters also suggest how Dewey’s parenting experiences 
affected his thinking about language and communication. Specifically, these let-
ters suggest that Dewey’s parenting helped him see language activity as primarily 
concerned with agreement in action.
The Development of Dewey’s Thinking  
about Language and Individuality
Dewey’s early 1890s Thought News periodical project had sought broad changes in 
journalism as a key manifestation of language’s “institutional development.”22 By 
contrast, 1894’s “The Psychology of Infant Language” advanced a different approach 
to its subject that focused on the role of language in the development of individu-
als. In particular, whereas Dewey’s ideas about language and the social organism 
in Ann Arbor had pointed him to the need for mass linguistic “action” (writing, 
editing, and the founding of new kinds of newspapers), Dewey’s approach in “The 
Psychology of Infant Language” pointed him toward the importance of understand-
ing differences in individuals’ language development. In particular, Dewey’s focus 
on individuality and language development in his article forecasts a key aspect of 
E&C    Education and Culture
8    J. Dyehouse and K. Manke
Dewey’s pragmatic account of language and communication: its emphasis on “how 
individuals [come] to see themselves within the social relations and social under-
standings of their times, particularly through learning of gesture and language.”23 
Based on the account he gave in “The Psychology of Infant Language,” Dewey 
had been observing his children’s language development since 1889.24 However, 
it was not until the 1893 publication of an article by Frederick Tracy that Dewey 
published his own report on this subject.25 Tracy published his article on children’s 
language development while he was a fellow at Clark University. In it, Tracy pri-
marily asserted a “principle underlying the development of child-speech from the 
psychic point of view,” noting especially the way in which “primitive utterances 
. . . are associated with ideas . . . until finally the instrument of language is completely 
under control, and becomes the adequate medium for the expression of thought.”26 
Dewey’s article responded directly to Tracy’s publication, but it ignored Tra-
cy’s explicit attempts to draw “general conclusions . . . from the material at hand.”27 
Dewey was apparently disinterested in Tracy’s attempts to “set down . . . empirical 
laws” and to achieve “general statements” about language development.28 Instead, 
Dewey focused on Tracy’s data, supplementing it with the observations he had made 
of Fred, Evelyn, and Morris. Ultimately, Dewey was most overtly interested in advo-
cating an alternative program for language study. To this end, Dewey proposed a 
different method for studying language development than Tracy had implemented.29 
Dewey also suggested a hypothetical description of language development. 
The key to this description was Dewey’s idea that language development is the 
progressive refinement of sense. Tracy’s account of children’s language acquisi-
tion focused on how children’s “ideas” came to “clothe themselves . . . in words.”30 
His view of language was basically empiricist, in agreement with thinkers like 
John Locke, who considered language a means of “transmitt[ing] the private feel-
ings of the speaker to an audience” and who conceived language on the model of 
“separate and distinct minds transforming their private thoughts into audible and 
public speech.”31 Dewey showed himself more interested in the relation between 
language development and individuals’ consciousnesses. As Dewey argued, the 
reason to study language development is to understand language as a means for 
“attaching interest and distributing attention.”32 By contrast, Tracy had argued that 
the “most interesting” aspect of children’s language development in the third six 
months of life was the “gradual ‘clearing’ of childish concepts, as indicated by the 
steady circumscription of the application of names.”33 Specifically, Tracy described 
how “[w]hen a child calls the moon a lamp, or applies his word bô (ball) to bubbles, 
oranges, or other round objects,” “it is evident that one great striking resemblance 
has overshadowed the differences in the objects.”34 For his part, Dewey argued that 
the “tendency to apply the same term to a large number of objects (‘ball’ to ball, 
orange, moon, lamp-globe, etc.)” should not be understood as a child abstracting 
the “roundness” of these objects.35 Instead, Dewey argues, the “roundness” of the 
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ball “suggests to [the child] something which he has thrown, so that the moon is 
something to throw—if he could only get hold of it.”36 
In “The Psychology of Infant Language,” Dewey did not explicate his differ-
ences with Tracy over their contrasting views of language and its functions. How-
ever, Dewey did focus explicitly on his differing ideas about the process of language 
acquisition. Working from collected observations, Tracy had described what he 
took to be the basic course of language development in children under two years. 
Amending Tracy’s account, Dewey presented children’s language development as 
a process in which words incorporating the sense of many parts of speech—e.g., 
nouns, verbs, and interjections—became differentiated into words that have dis-
tinct senses. In explaining this understanding, Dewey began with Tracy’s finding 
that children’s minds probably privilege “concepts of activity.”37 Dewey suggested 
that words used by young children often include, for the child, complex associa-
tions of sense. Referencing his observations of Morris’s vocabulary at 12 months, 
Dewey noted that of Morris’s 17 total words, “only the four proper nouns”—”papa,” 
“mamma,” “grandma,” and “Freddy”—”are, psychologically speaking, names of 
objects.”38 The other 13 words, Dewey suggested, cannot so easily be assigned to 
any particular part of speech. As Dewey explained, 
Water is a verb as well as a noun; door is always accompanied by gestures of 
reaching, and an attempt to swing the door back and fro; “daw” is appar-
ently a request, an expression of expectation of something good to eat and 
the name of a thing all together; bottle certainly has adjectival and verbal 
implications as well as nominal. At present I should regard it as a com-
plex, “nominal-adjectival-verbal,” the emphasis being on the noun, while 
six weeks previously it was, say, “verbal-adjectival-nominal.” “Stop”; “no, 
no”; “burn”; “see there,” etc., are equally interjections and verbs. “Thank 
you” is at times a request for something, and is almost invariably said when 
giving an article to any one else.39 
Based on these observations, as well as his reading of Tracy’s findings, Dewey sug-
gested a hypothetical description of language development as the refinement of 
linguistic sense. This is, Dewey explains, “the gradual differentiation of the origi-
nal protoplasmic verbal-nominal-interjectional form . . . until words assume their 
present rigidity.”40 In Morris’s case, “bottle” initially meant all of “drinking” and 
“bottle-like” and “bottle.” As he developed, however, Morris would come to use 
words like “bottle” as adults do—that is to say, as a noun that indicates a closed 
container of liquid. 
It is worth noting that Dewey’s foray into infant psychology held out the 
promise of strengthening a key plank in Dewey’s contemporary ethics. Indeed, this 
study promised to affirm individuality “in fact,” as he put it in the Study of Ethics.41 
We are each born to our capacities, Dewey then believed, and our challenge is to 
develop better understandings of them. Indeed, Dewey thought that the study of 
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ethics is nothing less than the scientific analysis of such capacities and their possi-
bilities. Armed with a historical understanding of personal capacities as well as an 
analysis of what such capacities might eventually become, Dewey held that ethical 
agents could develop better moral practice. In Jennifer Welchman’s summary of 
Dewey’s theory, “the moral scientist was (1) to describe and explain just what ideal 
personal capacities had historically been realized by human agents and (2) to sug-
gest ways ideal personal capacities (and so persons themselves) could be more freely 
and fully realized.”42 Dewey apparently hoped that language study could prove, as 
the Study of Ethics had merely supposed, that the “capacities of a child . . . are not 
simply of a child, not of a man, but of this child, not of any other.”43 
If Dewey’s studies of his children’s language development promised to 
strengthen the ideas about individuality supposed by his contemporary ethics, 
they also anticipated his (and George Herbert Mead’s) later focus on how shared 
language activity shapes individuality. Dewey’s study of his children’s language 
development was designed to clarify how individuals come to experience themselves 
(and their world) as they do. This kind of project—William James called it the study 
of “psychogenesis”—was much in vogue in the United States in the 1890s.44 For his 
part, Dewey had a specific agenda for his thinking about how individuals come to 
see themselves as individuals. “I believe the tendency in all psychological investiga-
tion, at present, is to attempt to get a uniform mathematical statement, eliminating 
individual differences,” Dewey explained in “The Psychology of Infant Language.”45 
Yet, “for pedagogical and ethical purposes,” Dewey continued, “it is these differ-
ences which are, finally, most important.”46 Dewey’s study of language development 
did not seek, as had Josiah Royce’s thinking about psychogenesis, an explanation 
of how “finite selves came to believe in the world of objects.”47 Rather, Dewey was 
interested in how an individually unique mode of speech (e.g., as revealed in “the 
varying ratio of adverbs and pronouns on one side and nouns and adjectives on 
the other”) “must denote a very different psychological attitude—different meth-
ods of attaching interest and distributing attention.”48 In other words, even in 1894 
Dewey was beginning to grasp how shared, social language activity shapes the 
development of humans as singular individuals. 
Agreement in Action
In the whole of Dewey’s correspondence from the summer and fall of 1894, only a 
small selection of passages suggest that Dewey was pursuing a scientific study of his 
children’s language development. Indeed, far from portraying Dewey as a clinical 
observer, these letters rather give the impression of a man who was experiencing “a 
powerful awakening of his loving emotions” and who, “with the rest of his family 
abroad,” showered “all of the loving care and attention that [he] had in limitless store 
. . . on Morris.”49 The many pages devoted to Morris provide a compelling portrait 
of a father falling deeply in love with his child, and they suggest why Dewey might 
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have been shattered emotionally by Morris’s death in Europe in 1895. (As Evelyn 
Dewey recounted in a biography of their father, Morris’s death was “a blow from 
which neither of his parents ever fully recovered.”50)
For contemporary readers, foreknowledge of Morris’s death gives the letters a 
tragic quality, which colors especially the loving accounts of Morris that John wrote 
down in them. Yet, in addition to the poetic sorts of experiences these letters offer to 
readers, there are also available insights of a more prosaic nature. The letters make abun-
dantly clear, for instance, Dewey’s pride in his son’s intelligence. They also convey the 
close proximity in which Dewey lived with his son.51 This close association gave Dewey 
fertile experiential material for use in his contemporary reflections on language devel-
opment as well as other topics.52 But John’s and Morris’s close association may also have 
affected John’s subsequent thinking about language and communication. As Dewey’s 
letters can suggest, his doings with his son inspired him to linger repeatedly on the 
relationship of language to what he would later call “social cooperation.”53 Separately 
from his contemporary ruminations on language, psychology, and ethics, it seems, 
Dewey appreciated watching his son discover how language affects group activities. 
Beyond many conventional expressions of John’s pride in his son’s intelli-
gence, some of his proudest observations of Morris speak to the latter’s facility with 
language. On 18 November 1894, John remarked that Morris “almost never does a 
thing of any kind without telling it or asking a question about it; if he doesn’t do it 
alonde [sic]; you hear him talking to himself.”54 This remark summarizes much in 
Dewey’s letters’ observations of Morris, and it suggests the positive regard in which 
Dewey held his son’s speaking activity. The previous month, John had offered a por-
trait that was similar in its approbation for Morris’s communication. In addition, 
however, this later letter particularly stressed the social or community dimension 
of Morris’s speaking. In it, John describes Morris’s actions and words as two parts 
of the “centre” of social life Morris made of himself at the rooming house:    
He is one centre of action & glee, talking, playing & laughing with no inter-
mittence. He not only attends to the conveniences of life, but goes after the 
pot himself, puts it out of the closet &c. He talks so much it is impossible 
to keep any track of his words. Gma told him this morning that his bottle 
was on the bed; He said “Milk in it, I s’pose.” When I began writing he 
was sitting beside me with his doll, a little pail of water & a piece of paper 
busily engaged in washing the doll’s face. He had brought the pail to me, & 
instead of saying ‘want water’ he said pap “want papa to reach”. A minute 
ago he heard the bell ring, jumped || down & said “Go see popm (post-
man), be raight back” & he is now ^in^ [w. caret] the hall, calling with all 
his might to various members of the Morse family.55
This passage attests to his father’s pride at Morris’s verbal facility. But it also empha-
sizes the way in which John saw Morris’s speaking as thoroughly integrated with 
his various activities. Commenting on his surroundings, interacting with his family 
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members, and hailing other members of their little community, Morris in John’s 
depiction is experimenting with words as means for shaping shared behavior. 
One of John’s anecdotes particularly emphasizes the wonderment he appar-
ently experienced at Morris’s doings with language. In the midst of a complaining 
letter to Alice, John inserted the following lines:
Morris showed one of his supernatural gleams of intelligence yesterday. 
When I was || finishing my letter to you he climbed up in my lap. As quick as 
I had written the address on the envelope & sealed it he began “I want to go 
to the post-office.” Of course, the operation had been gone thro’ with some-
time before but I hadn’t the remotest idea when or how he got hold of it.56
At the time of John’s writing, Morris had recently passed his second birthday, and, 
as John’s letters document, he had been speaking in sentences for some time. Mor-
ris had also demonstrated himself capable of expressing his intentions in complex 
verbal statements. Despite these accomplishments, Dewey was apparently baffled 
by his son’s anticipation of their trip to the post office. John acknowledged that he 
and Morris had undergone “the operation”—of sealing and addressing a letter and 
then delivering it to the post office—“sometime before” (that is to say, previously 
to the event being described). But John professed himself not to have “the remot-
est idea when or how [Morris] got hold” of the meaning of this operation (so that 
he could anticipate one of its phases based on the completion of a previous phase). 
Given the frequency of John’s letter-writing activities, it does not seem surprising 
that Morris could achieve and act on this kind of understanding. Yet, something 
in the interaction fascinated Dewey. In other words, Dewey saw in this apparently 
ordinary exchange something deeply significant—and interesting—to himself.
Was there in John’s wonderment at Morris’s “gleam of intelligence” the germ 
of those accounts of language and social cooperation that featured prominently 
in his later pragmatism? In Experience and Nature, Dewey best explained his idea 
that the “heart of language is not ‘expression’ of something antecedent, much less 
expression of antecedent thought. It is communication; the establishment of coop-
eration in an activity in which there are partners, and in which the activity of each 
is modified and regulated by partnership.”57 In that book, as in other works, Dewey 
offered examples to help readers understand his view of language.58 
In Democracy and Education, one illustration of how language shapes coop-
erative activity recalls his post office anecdote. Specifically, in a digression on “how 
language works,” Dewey explains that 
The baby begins of course with mere sounds, noises, and tones having no 
meaning, expressing, that is, no idea. Sounds are just one kind of stimulus to 
direct response, some having a soothing effect, others tending to make one 
jump, and so on. The sound h-a-t would remain as meaningless as a sound 
in Choctaw, a seemingly inarticulate grunt, if it were not uttered in connec-
tion with an action which is participated in by a number of people. When the 
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mother is taking the infant out of doors, she says “hat” as she puts something 
on the baby’s head. Being taken out becomes an interest to the child; mother 
and child not only go out with each other physically, but both are concerned 
in the going out; they enjoy it in common. By conjunction with the other fac-
tors in activity the sound “hat” soon gets the same meaning for the child that 
it has for the parent; it becomes a sign of the activity into which it enters.59
Dewey goes on to argue that “the sound h-a-t gains meaning in precisely the same 
way that the thing ‘hat’ gains it, by being used in a given way. And they acquire the 
same meaning with the child which they have with the adult because they are used 
in a common experience by both.”60 As Biesta puts it, “common understanding is 
produced by, is the outcome of successful cooperation in action.”61
For the present argument, the notable feature of Democracy and Education’s 
example is the main characters: the mother and her infant. Admittedly, these figures 
are not in any obvious way ciphers for Dewey and his son. Yet, there are in Dewey’s 
published example some clear parallels to John’s story about Morris and the post office. 
Both narrations involve a parent interacting with a child who is acquiring language. 
Both also linger over the significance of an utterance in relation to shared activity. 
The most suggestive parallel, however, concerns the action of both stories—that of 
“going out.” In Dewey’s published example, he remarks that “Being taken out becomes 
an interest to the child; mother and child not only go out with each other physically, 
but both are concerned in the going out; they enjoy it in common.”62 This, in outline 
at least, is much the same in John’s story about Morris and the letter. Having enjoyed 
trips to the post office “sometime before,” Morris wanted to repeat this enjoyment with 
his father. Paraphrasing Democracy and Education, we can say that by conjunction 
with the other factors in activity, the utterance “I want to go to the post office” got 
the same meaning for Morris that it had for John. On this view, Dewey was, in 1894, 
already in possession of one of pragmatic communicative philosophy’s key insights. 
Language, Individuality, and Action  
in the Laboratory School
As we have argued, Dewey’s parenting led him to insights that anticipate the distinc-
tive features of his pragmatic philosophy of language and communication. In one 
direction, Dewey’s parenting experiences helped him to appreciate how shared lan-
guage use shapes individuals’ individuality. In another direction, Dewey’s parenting 
experiences helped him to appreciate how language activity is primarily concerned 
with agreement in action (or cooperation). In addition, Dewey’s parenting affected 
his contemporary thinking about language and communication in education. 
On the view represented in Dewey’s later writings, of course, there is nothing 
“supernatural” at all in Morris’s having learned a distinguishing verbal sign of his 
and his father’s enjoyed activity. Indeed, Dewey would later insist on the specifically 
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natural quality of just this kind of achievement.63 In 1894, however, Dewey did not 
completely grasp—nor did he necessarily want to grasp—the account of language 
and communication that he would later develop. In 1894, Dewey had mostly aban-
doned his earlier efforts to philosophize about discourse as the social organism’s sen-
sorium, and what remained of his enthusiasm for language activities’ social functions 
he apparently channeled into the study of his own children’s language development. 
As we have seen, one of the insights he gained through the studies reported in “The 
Psychology of Infant Language” was that social language activity shapes individual 
psychology. Originating in his parenting experiences, that insight would become 
a key part of his (and Mead’s) later thinking about language and communication.
In the middle and later months of 1894, Dewey’s attentions were clearly shift-
ing away from language-focused inquiries, and his contemporary thinking seems 
very far indeed from the attention to discourse that returned to his philosophy so 
spectacularly in Experience and Nature’s chapter on “Nature, Communication and 
Meaning.” Nevertheless, there is in Dewey’s attentions to his children’s language 
development an intimation of his later thinking about language and activity. In 
particular, his wonderment at Morris’s intelligence, like his sensitivity to Morris’s 
experiments in social communication, hint at a dawning sense of awareness that 
shared, cooperative behavior matters primarily in language. Much later, Dewey 
argued that “a sound or mark of any physical existence” is “part of language only 
in virtue of its operational force; that is, as it functions as a means of evoking dif-
ferent activities performed by different persons so as to produce consequences that 
are shared by all the participants in the conjoint undertaking.”64 Much in this lat-
ter conception seems anticipated in Dewey’s observation of Morris’s achievement.
Dewey’s early parenting experiences also affected his contemporary thinking 
about pedagogy.65 Although full consideration of his parenting’s influence on his 
1890s pedagogical ideas is not possible here, Dewey’s contemporary pedagogical 
writings strongly suggest this influence’s importance. Specifically, Dewey’s “My 
Pedagogic Creed” (1897) confirms that Dewey had applied to his educational think-
ing the insights about language and the development of individuality he indicated 
in “The Psychology of Infant Language.” Regarding Dewey’s pedagogical applica-
tion of the developing insights about language and cooperative behavior suggested 
in his 1894 correspondence, Dewey’s 1895 Plan of Organization of the University 
Primary School provides similar indications.  
In general, “My Pedagogic Creed” summarizes Dewey’s contemporary thinking 
about education. In particular, Dewey articulates his contemporary intentions with 
respect to language and communication education.66 In this article, however, the influ-
ence of Dewey’s 1894 thinking about language is not most visible in the sections where 
Dewey outlines his “occupation”-oriented approach to language pedagogy. Rather, 
this influence appears most clearly in Dewey’s opening section, on “What Education 
Is.”67 In that section, Dewey attends to psychogenesis as the stimulation of a child’s 
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emergence “from his [sic] original narrowness of action and feeling and to conceive 
of himself [sic] from the standpoint of the welfare of the group to which he belongs.”68 
Dewey explicitly connects this process of individuation with children’s language learn-
ing. “For instance,” he observes, “through the response which is made to the child’s 
instinctive babblings the child comes to know what those babblings mean; they are 
transformed into articulate language and thus the child is introduced into the con-
solidated wealth of ideas and emotions which are now summed up in language.”69 In 
this statement, language activity functions as a key means for children’s individuation.
If “My Pedagogic Creed” can indicate the presence of Dewey’s early thinking 
about the individuation of individuals in his contemporary pedagogy, Dewey’s 1895 
Plan of Organization of the University Primary School provides similar indications 
about the influence of his thinking about communication and social cooperation. In 
general, this Plan defined “the general spirit” in which the Laboratory School’s work 
was to be undertaken.70 More specifically, this Plan outlined the school’s approach 
to what Dewey called the child’s “expressions.” Inveighing against empiricist views 
of language as “expression of thought,” Dewey specifically argues that 
The child does not realize an activity save as he [sic] feels that it is directed 
towards others and calls forth a response from others. Language, for example, 
whether speech, writing, or reading, is not primarily expression of thought, but 
rather social communication. Save as it realizes this function, it is only partial 
(and more or less artificial) and fails, therefore, of its educative effect, intel-
lectually, as well as morally; its complete, or organic, stimulus being absent.71 
Dewey gave a somewhat clearer and more detailed account of this theory of expres-
sion in his 1896 article addressed to drawing teachers, “Imagination and Expres-
sion.”72 Even in his 1895 Plan, however, Dewey was overtly applying, in his notion 
of “social communication,” his developing understanding of communication as 
primarily a means for modulating social cooperation. 
From the point of view of intellectual history, more remains to be demon-
strated about the influence of Dewey’s early parenting experiences upon his early 
pedagogical experiments. In particular, practical confirmation for this influence 
that we have sketched can also be pursued in the many extant records of the Labo-
ratory School’s activities. As we have discovered in our ongoing researches, across 
the many kinds of documents preserved from the School’s early years, there exists 
considerable evidence that Dewey’s nascent ideas about language, individuality, and 
social cooperation informed the work that Laboratory School teachers carried out 
with their students. In one particularly rich example, for instance, students engaged 
in what we might now call “maker space” pedagogies in order to make a space—a 
“clubhouse”—for the benefit of the School’s debate and photography clubs.73 In the 
clubhouse project, the Laboratory School’s teachers overtly stimulated students’ 
“emerg[ence]” from their “original narrowness of action and feeling,” encouraging 
them to conceive themselves “from the standpoint of the welfare of the group.”74 
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Likewise, in their elaborate planning discussions for and reflections upon the 
clubhouse’s construction, teachers and students practiced speaking, writing, and 
gesturing not as “expression of thought” but instead as “social communication.”75 
These anticipations of Dewey’s later pragmatism in his early pedagogical experi-
ments suggest that, in records of these endeavors, contemporary educators might 
find clues to new sorts of pedagogies. Indeed, to the degree that the Laboratory 
School can be productively likened to contemporary educational experiments, these 
records may hold important clues for reconstructing contemporary pedagogies. 
Implications for Educational Inquiry
In seeking to warrant expanded inquiry into Dewey’s and his colleagues’ Laboratory 
School experiments, we do not deny their limitations.76 Nevertheless, neither do we 
believe that these experiments only reflect their limitations; in addition, they make 
available tools that may be useful in contemporary circumstances. In keeping with 
understandings of archival and intellectual history practiced in our own field, rhetoric 
and composition, study of past trials can open new possibilities in the present. In this 
particular instance, against the dominant sense in our field that Dewey’s pragmatism 
privileges discourse and, particularly, conversation as society’s most critical educational 
and political agencies, these early pedagogical experiments can suggest that Dewey val-
ued discursive activities primarily as extensions to productive, embodied, collaborative, 
material inquiry. In this way, for example, Dewey’s Laboratory School experiments can 
make available specifically conceptual tools for thinking through present problems.
Renewed inquiry into Dewey’s and his colleagues’ Laboratory School experi-
ments might also yield new viewpoints on contemporary educational practice. When 
researchers in our field called for reflection on literacy education and contemporary 
“makerspace” movements, for instance, we responded with a discussion of the Labo-
ratory School as an anticipation of—and departure from—practices characterizing 
contemporary makerspace pedagogy.77 Historical comparisons of these kinds, we 
believe, can deepen more abstract considerations of Dewey’s educational legacy. By 
warranting study of Dewey’s and his colleagues’ practices, in short, we seek to authorize 
not only further study of Dewey’s ideas but also of his concrete, historical inquiries.
Finally, we believe that further study of the Laboratory School’s experiments 
can augment current work to articulate “Deweyan” kinds of ideals for contempo-
rary education. In “John Dewey, W. E. B. Dubois, and a Rhetoric of Education,” 
for instance, Keith Gilyard has recently articulated a vision for what he calls the 
“parameters” of an anti-racist schooling agenda fashioned by Dewey and Dubois.78 
Notably, in this attempt to frame large-scale ends for contemporary American edu-
cation, Gilyard draws primarily on Dewey’s 1897 “My Pedagogic Creed.” If scholars 
accept Fallace’s contention that Dewey’s educational thinking in 1897 was primarily 
“ethnocentric,” they will fail to fully appreciate the possibilities in Gilyard’s projec-
tions. By contrast, if scholars do take on the problem of investigating the complex 
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ideational and practical history that led up to Dewey’s expression of his creed, they 
will be better positioned to respond to Gilyard’s call to “revisit and attempt to revise 
fruitfully our liberal, progressive, and radical education traditions.”79 
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